Abstract. Elliptic curves over number elds with CM can be used to design non-isogenous elliptic cryptosystems over nite elds eciently. The existing algorithm to build such CM curves, so-called the CM eld algorithm, is based on analytic expansion of modular functions, costing computations of O (2 5h=2 h 21=4 ) where h is the class number of the endomorphism ring of the CM curve. Thus it is eective only in the small class number cases.
Introduction
Elliptic curves over nite elds have been used in recent public key cryptosystems, authentication and signature schemes. The discrete logarithm problems over the elliptic curves can resist all known subexponential attacks, which then can implement cryptographic schemes in higher speed and less key sizes while retain the same security comparing with traditional cryptographic functions [14] [22] [21] . Among the methods to construct explicitly secure elliptic curves over nite elds for cryptosystem applications, the point-counting algorithms, now known as the SEA algorithms can nd secure curves over nite elds from randomly selected elliptic curves, but still be quite time consuming since they generally need to be repeated many times until a secure curve is found [27] [28] [8] [24] [20] [10] . Another diculty of this approach is that when one wishes to choose dierent curves for dierent users or periodically change curves over nite elds in the same cryptosystem, he has to undergo the whole process of the above calculations, or it always takes the same computations in order to obtain any new secure curves and cryptosystems. According to [16] , if the same curve over a nite eld is repeatedly used in an elliptic cryptosystem, even each time with a random base point, one can easily transform the new discrete logarithm problem into the old one. Thus the old database can be made good use of such that one can attack this kind of cryptosystems faster, comparing with those which switch each time to a new or non-isogenous curve over a nite eld. Furthermore, if one is willing to build a large database, then with certain variations of the Baby step Giant step algorithm, one can attack the cryptosystems using a xed curve over a nite eld in time of O(q 1=d ); d > 2, rather than the standard complexity of the Baby step and Giant step algorithm: O( p q).
Another approach to build secure elliptic curves over nite elds, which is much faster and meets the requirement to change to non-isogenous curves frequently, is to use a family of elliptic curves dened over number elds, i.e. those with complex multiplication or CM elliptic curves [23] [2] [3] [4] [19] . In fact, the CM curves may not be easy to nd, but once a CM curve over a number eld is built, one can use very simple and fast algorithms to design directly non-isogenous curves over nite elds with dierent and maybe prespecied (almost prime) orders, therefore dierent secure cryptosystems as many as one wishes, if he changes the characteristics and extension degrees of the nite denition elds. This can be done by ecient algorithms of reduced quadratic forms (see appendix) or the Cornacchia algorithm. As to the security of using CM curves, it is known that all elliptic curves over nite elds are with CM (so usually they are not referred to as CM curves and we will leave the name exclusively to curves over number elds). Furthermore, each elliptic curve over a nite eld is the reduction of an CM curve (known as its Deuring's lifting) over a certain number eld. If there were any attack which works eective particularly for the elliptic cryptosystems designed from CM curves, we may need only to consider the lifting attacks which lift the elliptic curves over nite elds to their Deuring's liftings over number elds and solve the discrete logarithm problems over number elds. However, it is well known that these kind of attacks seem exponentially hard due to diculty in lifting the rational points of elliptic curves from nite elds to number elds, the exponentially explosion of the heights of these rational points over number elds, and the nite rank of their Mordell-Weil groups. In fact, these are the same arguments known for security of general elliptic cryptosystems [22] , i.e., on the immunity of generic elliptic curves from attacks of the index-calculus algorithm. Existing algorithms used for construction of CM curves, somewhat vaguely called \CM eld algorithms", are based on construction of class elds using analytic series expansions of the modular functions over C( [1] and also [7] [12]) Although theoretically these algorithms can build any elliptic curve overnite elds, they seemed tedious and always involved with problems such as approximation errors. Their complexity is known as an exponential function
) of the class number h, assuming the elliptic curves have their endomorphism rings as an imaginary quadratic order with the class number h. Therefore, they becomes impractical for large class numbers. Besides, the scenario of the CM eld algorithms, i.e. to start from a particular order of an elliptic curve over a given nite eld, then calculate the j-invariant of the elliptic curve over the class eld and nally dene the model of the elliptic curve over the nite eld with the assigned order, seems somewhat misleading and unnecessarily involved. In fact, a clearer and simpler scenario consists of two stages. The rst one is to build an explicit model of a CM curve over the class eld. The second stage is to design the order of the curve over a nite eld. The computation time of the rst stage is obviously dominant. As long as one has a model of elliptic curve with CM over a number eld, as mentioned before, he can use this curve to design dierent isogenous classes of secure curves over large nite elds. It maybe interesting to notice the curves over nite elds with the Frobenius endomorphisms with small traces or the endomorphism rings of large class numbers can be most quickly calculated by the SEA algorithms, while the curves with the endomorphism rings of small class numbers or the Frobenius endomorphisms with large traces are most easily dealt by the algorithms using CM curves but are of most time consuming for the SEA algorithms. Thus, the key issue in using CM curves to design elliptic cryptosystems is to nd models of CM elliptic curves over number elds eciently, in copious supply, and with endomorphism rings of large discriminants or class numbers. In [25] [26], we shown probabilistic algorithms to nd random CM elliptic and higher genus curves by CM tests, which requires no calculation of j-invariants or class equations. In this paper, we rst show the CM test algorithms in a more complete form to nd random CM curves. Then we show how to construct ring class elds or the denition elds of the CM curves without explicit construction of class equations, i.e. from ray class elds which can be easily derived using division polynomials. Finally, an ecient deterministic algorithm for lifting the ring class equations from small nite elds is presented to construct CM curves. The complexity of this algorithm is of polynomial time in the class number h: O(h 7 ). All calculations in these algorithms are simple and easy to implement. Since there is only algebraic manipulations involved, no care is needed about approximation errors control during the calculations. An interesting generalization of these algorithms is to Jacobian varieties of algebraic curves of higher genera [13] (see also [5] ).
CM tests for elliptic curves
We show in this section fast algorithms to test if an elliptic curve over a number eld is with CM, which can be used to nd random CM curves over number elds without calculation of j-invariants and their class equations. Denition 1. An elliptic curve E over a eld F is with complex multiplication or a CM elliptic curve if its endomorphism ring End F E contains the rational integral ring Z as a proper subring.
We refer the details of theory of complex multiplication to standard references. e.g. [17] [25] Input : Random elliptic curves E=F;
Output : Pseudo-CM curves and the discriminants of their CM elds.
Step 1 Choose a small prime p 1 such that E=F q1 is an ordinary reduction. Step 2 Step 1 Choose a small prime p 1 such that E=F q1 is an ordinary reduction. Step 2 Output : Pseudo-CM curves and the discriminants of their CM elds.
Step 1 Choose a small prime p 1 such that E=F q1 is an ordinary reduction. Step 2 Choose small primes p i such that ( 11 p i ) = 0, then if E=F p 2 i are supersingular or an additive bad reduction for all i, output E as a pseudo-CM curve with the discriminant D 1 . Otherwise, output E=F as without CM.
Remark 1: The calculations in these tests can be obviously done by fast algorithms in polynomial time in log p amx .
Remark 2: With extra computations, the step 2 can be rened to identify the isomorphism types of the endomorphism rings by e.g. Kohel's algorithm [15] .
In that case, one will be able to output the discriminants of the endomorphism rings.
Remark 3: Naturally one can combine these procedures to raise the computational eciency. e.g. after the step 1, for the rst N primes apply the step 2 of each procedures. Besides, the latter two ones should be applied rst. Ordinary reductions over prime elds are also preferable.
If the class equation was known, one can use the following test which is based on the result of Gross-Zagier [11] , which is very sharp but the calculation of discriminant becomes heavy for large class numbers.
Gross-Zagier test
Step 1 If the constant term of f(x) is not d-smooth, output NO;
Step 2 If the discriminant of f(x) is not (3=4)d-smooth, output NO;
Step 3 Output f(
3 Construction of ring class elds from ray class elds In fact, to construct a ring class eld, over which the CM elliptic curves are dened, is not the same thing to nd the singular moduli or the j-invariants which generate the ring class eld. As shown bellow, the former could be much easier than the latter. In this way, one can readily produce a ring class eld or its moduli eld, which can be used in the CM test algorithms in the previous section as denition elds of CM elliptic curves. However, since CM curves over a particular number eld are of nite number so the probability to nd them could be very low. One may wish to use more ecient and deterministic algorithm to nd a CM curve by calculation of the ring class equation H d (x), which is also a minimal polynomial of Q(j(O c )). To present such an algorithm will be the task of the following section. In supersingular lifting, check at rst that if the endomorphism rings of the curves contain an optimal embedding of O c , the imaginary order which is chosen as the endomorphism ring of the target CM curve.
Remark 3: In fact, lifting from only prime elds is possible once a discriminant is chosen appropriately. Thus there is no need to build the ring class eld a priori even in implicit form. Thus, by using only the lifting from prime elds, calculation of the division polynomials can also be omitted. In fact, the Hilbert class equations can also be lifted in the similar way.
Examples of CM tests
We As we know, they are truly CM curves. In fact, the supersingular and bad reduction tests distinguish even sharperly between CM and non-CM curves (see proof of the algorithm 1 for reasons). Bellow, we show a part of it with small coecients. Let P i be a prime ideal of O F lying over p i . By the Deuring's reduction theory of elliptic curves, the reduction mod P i induces an injective ring homomorphism of endomorphisms of the elliptic curve End F E to End F q i E. This map however induces a eld isomorphism between the endomorphism elds if the elliptic curve is with CM and the reduction is ordinary.
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Thus, if a curve E is non-CM and E=F qi is an ordinary reduction, then End F q i E will be imaginary quadratic elds with random discriminants. On the other hand, if a curve is CM, one will have the same End F q E for any ordinary reduction at p. Thus, the ordinary test will always reject non-CM curves and after N repetance of the ordinary reduction, the survived curves will be with CM in probability larger than 1 0 1=2 N .
As to the supersingular reduction, it is known by Serre that for generic curves, the set of primes S(x) = fp i < xjE=F qi is supersingular g has density of zero and is conjectured that #S(x)=(x) = O(1= p x). The bad reduction at the chosen primes is even much rare for non-CM curves. Therefore, the later two tests can abandon non-CM curves even more eciently or with higher probability. QED Besides, it is easy to prove that the degrees of p i 's which induce supersingular and bad reductions in the moduli eld Q(j(O c )) are less than two. Thus, it is enough to look for the candidates of CM j-invariants over F p 2 i . QED ). On the other hand, the calculations in step 3 to calculate the coecients of H d (x) by the CRT will be dominant, which costs O(h 7 ). In conclusion, the whole calculations will be in complexity of O(h 7 ).
